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I want to let you in on one of the best kept secrets in Washington, a town usually 
thought of as a sieve: federal regulation of passenger automobiles is by far the most 
extensive case of government influence on a consumer product. There is no close second. 
Moreover, that regulation is extremely burdensome and the outlook is for more rather 
than less. 
Specific regulations cover almost every aspect of the vehicle, including design, 
production, and operation. Government is directly involved in setting standards for such 
basic items as engines, bumpers, headrests, seat belts, door latches, brakes, fuel systems, 
and windshields, as well as the type of fuel that can be used. 
The Shortcomings of Existing Automobile Regulation 
Yet among this vast array of government paperwork and directives there is no 
coordination of the various regulatory agencies administering them. The regulations, and 
the regulators, often work at cross-purposes. 
For example, the law to control emissions reduces fuel efficiency by an estimated 
7.5 percent. The government's requirements concerning side-door guard beams, energy-
absorbing steering columns, and other safety features have added about 200 pounds to the 
weight of an automobile. These government actions lower fuel economy - and generate 
more pollution in the process. 
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In turn, fuel-economy standards have been frequently raised. These rules have 
forced the manufacture of smaller, lighter cars that are inherently less safe than the 
heavier cars that would otherwise be produced. When two cars of different size collide, 
the safety advantage lies with the occupants of the heavier vehicle. Also, in single 
vehicle accidents (such as hitting a tree), the occupants of heavier cars are likely to suffer 
fewer injuries. 
As a result, the chance of being involved in a fatal accident is about twice as great 
in a subcompact as it is in a larger automobile. The fuel-efficiency standards applied to 
cars made in the United States after 1990 are estimated to result in more than 2,200 
additional traffic deaths every year. That is the conclusion of research even after taking 
into account the tendency of occupants of smaller cars to use their safety belts more 
frequently. 
By the way, this is another sad example of an important point usually overlooked 
in emotional debates on regulation: well-meaning regulation does not always save lives. 
The critics of regulation may be just as concerned for people and their welfare as the 
proponents of government intervention. 
Overall, safety and emissions requirements add more than $2,500 to the price of 
the average new automobile. That's a stiff hidden tax on the American motorist. 
The indirect effects are even greater. The higher cost of new automobiles 
resulting from the hidden regulatory tax means that many people are driving their old cars 
longer because they cannot afford to replace them. As a result, the nation is not getting 
the intended benefits of the host of safety-environmental-energy regulations that have 
been promulgated. Also, because of the higher costs imposed on automobiles, drivers are 
encouraged to use less expensive motorcycles and bicycles, which are often cheaper but 
less safe than conventional motor cars. 
Automobile regulation in the United States is also characterized by great 
reluctance to interfere directly with individual behavior. From the viewpoint of the 
bureaucracy, it is easier for government to regulate business - but not always more 
effective. For example, by far the major cause of automobile accidents is driver error, 
often on the part of drunken motorists. About three out of five fatal automobile crashes 
are caused by driver error. Another one-fifth are caused by aggressive driving. 
Also, two out of five pedestrians killed by automobiles could be considered 
legally intoxicated. Nevertheless, regulation concentrates on the companies that make 
and distribute the products that people use, rather than on the way people use them. This 
is evident when we compare the relative softness in enforcing statutes on driving while 
intoxicated with the stringent requirements for safety-related components imposed on 
manufacturers of motor vehicles. 
Perhaps the saddest example of the unanticipated effects of regulation is the case 
of airbags. Because many automobile passengers do not use their seat belts, the federal 
government, after considerable debate, requires the installation of more expensive 
passive-restraint systems. These systems can be activated without any action by the 
driver or passengers, notably air bags that inflate in a frontal collision. Yet, airbags have 
generated serious adverse side effects not taken into account by the people writing the 
regulations. 
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Approximately 30 children and 20 adults were killed by airbags in the years 1991 
to 1996. The problem arose because the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration 
(NHTSA) required the bags to have enough force to protect a physically mature adult not 
wearing a seat belt. The regulators ignored warnings about the different impacts on 
children and smaller adults, especially women. Public outrage is forcing a modification 
of this poorly-thought-through requirement. However, NHTSA still seems determined to 
focus primarily on the case of adult males not using their seat belts, relying on special 
modification for women and children. Nevertheless, children would be safer without 
airbags. 
In these remarks, I have focused on those government regulations which are 
unique to the automobile. But, as you know, there are many other regulations which are 
imposed on all companies that manufacture or market goods and services in the United 
States. Thus, automobile manufacturers, as well as sales and service organizations, must 
also meet the costly mandates of the DOJ, DOL, EEOC, EPA, ERISA, FEC, FTC, IRS, 
NLRB, OSHA, and SEC. 
Although some supporters of the status quo may wish the public to believe that 
regulation is a contest between "the forces of good" (meaning government) and "the 
forces of evil" (obviously, business), the reality is that the consumer is at the receiving 
end of all the repercussions - good and bad. Business is the middleman, which must 
collect higher prices from consumers to cover the cost of compliance. 
In this time of attention to benefit-cost analysis of government regulation, I must 
report that analysts who have made such comparisons have come to an adverse 
conclusion about automobile regulation. The costs of many programs to regulate 
automobile safety, fuel economy, and emissions are greater than their benefits. It is time 
to suggest less costly alternatives to achieve desired public policy. 
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For example, seat belts could greatly reduce fatalities at a lower cost than airbags 
- and without their adverse side effects - if a combination of education and 
enforcement increased their usage substantially. Stronger enforcement of anti-drunk laws 
would be much more effective than the status quo in motor vehicle regulation. The 
replacement of smelly old "clunkers" would be encouraged by a special type of tax 
reform: reversing the traditional assessment method whereby owners of old vehicles pay 
lower personal property taxes than the purchasers of newer, more fuel-efficient cars. 
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The government's CAFE standards, mandating "corporate average fuel economy" 
in terms of minimum mileage per gallon in gasoline used, are also counterproductive. By 
raising the cost of new automobiles, the standards make it less likely that consumers will 
trade in their older, less fuel-efficient cars. On balance, the CAFE standards do not 
reduce auto emissions or even reduce fuel consumption. Eliminating CAFE standards 
would surely be helpful. 
Some states are experimenting with "junker clunker" laws under which old and 
heavily polluting automobiles - which in effect are subsidized by the CAFE standards 
- are bought with government money and destroyed. In the private sector, Unocal 
crushed about 10,000 such cars in an effort to gain emissions credits under the Clean Air 
Act. To date, the effect of such innovations, we must acknowledge, has been very 
limited. 
More Regulation In the Offing 
The outlook is for much more, rather than less, burdensome regulation, especially 
in the environmental area. For example, northeastern states are threatening zero 
emissions requirements for motor vehicles, similar to California, in order to reduce smog 
levels. However, consumers are not likely to respond positively to the high-cost, low-
performance electric cars that are likely to be available to meet those new environmental 
standards. 
It is sad to have to acknowledge that we have reached the point where it is 
personally, and professionally, dangerous to criticize any proposal to "do more for the 
environment." Just raising a question about the practicality of an environmental proposal 
is guaranteed to result in the intrepid individual being castigated as caring more about 
dollars than ecology and having his or her viewpoint dismissed as defending "the 
polluters." I will save for another day the task of explaining why each of us is a 
"polluter" just by virtue of living on this planet. 
In any event, the single most controversial and costly regulatory issue facing the 
United States today is how to deal with the pressures to "do something" about global 
warming. Despite all of the scientific uncertainty about the impact of human activity on 
the earth's temperature- serious scientists admit that we all know too little- the 
current public policy debate assumes that the simple answer is to substantially reduce 
emissions of carbon dioxide (C02). 
This was the position taken at the United Nations' meeting in Kyoto, Japan, in 
December 1997. Worse yet, all of the responsibility for cutting back on the use of C02-
emitting fossil fuels, such as gasoline, was placed on the United States and the other 
industrialized nations - even though nations such as China and India are far less fuel 
efficient than the United States. The President has not yet submitted the Kyoto treaty to 
the Senate. But that has not stopped the Clinton Administration from launching some of 
the expensive initiatives that would be required to meet the treaty's provisions. 
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Many public and private organizations have analyzed, in depth, the impacts of a 
substantial rollback in C02 emissions on the American economy. For example, a carbon 
tax just sufficient to stabilize emissions at 1990 levels by 201 0 would slow down real 
wage growth, worsen the distribution of income, and make Americans feel as if they were 
living through the oil price shocks of the 1970s and early 1980s all over again. And the 
Kyoto requirements are more stringent than that. 
The major energy-using sectors would be hit hardest. These include many 
important manufacturing industries - notably, petroleum refining, motor vehicles, 
chemicals, paper, cement, steel, and aluminum. Electric utilities - most of which use 
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fossil fuel- would be very heavily affected and, because they serve virtually every part 
of American society, the results of a cutback in C02 emissions would be almost universal. 
The pervasive ramifications of the global warming issue are just an example of 
the need to carefully analyze the impacts of regulation and other forms of government 
intervention in the economy before Congress enacts a new regulatory statute and before a 
regulatory agency promulgates a new ruling. Frankly, this is not a plea to exempt or go 
easy on the automobile industry. Such special treatment is not good public policy. 
Instead, we need to reform the basic process by which Congress and the federal agencies 
regulate all American businesses and consumers. That's a tall order, but we need to start. 
Key Recommendations 
The fundamental motivation for reform is that, at its heart, regulation is not a 
business issue; it is a consumer concern. The cost of compliance with government 
regulation is buried in the higher prices that customers pay. 
But that disguise makes regulation especially attractive to government officials. 
The costs do not show up in the government's budget, and thus do not have to be paid for 
by direct taxation. Remember the old wisecrack, "The best tax is a hidden tax." 
I covered the multitude of automobile regulation earlier. However, numerous 
other rules and directives cover American businesses and consumers. Some of the 
regulations are just silly. Take the law that Congress passed in 1992 prohibiting home 
builders from installing toilets that hold more than 1.6 gallons of water. The idea was to 
help conserve water. In practice, it often takes two or three flushes to do the job. You 
have to wonder why the government has to become involved in such nonsense! 
If the problem was limited to just dealing with silly regulations, however, the 
private sector could live with the consequences. But the challenge is far more serious. 
High regulatory costs erode the competitiveness of American firms struggling in an 
increasingly global marketplace. So often our companies are forced to seek locations 
overseas with more benign regulatory systems. Consider the medical devices firms that 
find it makes sense to set up their new laboratories in the Netherlands. Holland is not a 
low-cost nation nor does it lack regulation of business. But it does have a more sensible 
and less adversarial approach to business-government relations. 
What can be done to improve government regulation? There is no quick fix, but 
several basic reforms would be extremely helpful. For starters, each congressional 
committee writing a regulatory statute should carefully weigh the pros and cons before it 
acts. That means, in practice, comparing the benefits expected from the regulations that 
will be issued with the costs they will impose. 
This sounds so basic that we must wonder why it has not been done. As I tell my 
students, a cynical explanation carries you a long way in understanding government 
policy. Many proponents of more government intervention are oblivious to the costs or 
don't want to know. 
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In order to carry out this desirable proposal, the members of Congress will need a 
new flow of information. Congress should set up a small, nonpartisan regulatory analysis 
office to generate reliable data, including the needed estimates of benefits and costs. This 
would be a modest but useful investment in shifting the debate from emotion to facts. 
In order to make good use of such information, Congress should also eliminate 
provisions of existing laws that prevent regulatory agencies from even considering costs 
or comparing expected benefits with costs when designing and promulgating regulations. 
The Clean Air Act is a prime example. The new ozone (smog) standard flunks 
even EPA's own benefit-cost analysis, producing $100 million to $2.8 billion in benefits 
at a cost of between $1 billion and $10 billion. The President's own Council of 
Economic Advisers pegs the benefits at between $200 million and $1 billion a year and 
; 
the costs between $12 billion and $60 billion! But the Act does not allow the EPA to 
consider costs at the time it sets the standard, only after the decision has already been 
made based on providing an "adequate" margin of safety against any adverse health 
effect. 
Sensible regulatory reform is not a partisan issue. Congress should incorporate 
into law the requirements for executive branch review of proposed regulations along the 
lines of the executive orders promulgated by both President Reagan and President 
Clinton. The real deficiency is not in the different ~ording of the orders but in the fact 
that none of them has the "teeth" that would be contained in a statute covering all 
regulatory activities in the executive branch of the federal government. 
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Finally, Congress should require, on an experimental basis, the development of a 
detailed accounting of the costs imposed by the regulatory agencies. This information 
could form the basis for a badly needed innovation: the introduction of a new 
government-wide regulatory budget that would put a lid on the compliance costs imposed 
on the private sector. 
Of course, it is unrealistic to advocate wholesale elimination of agencies, 
especially in the environmental and safety areas of regulation. Rather, we need to 
improve the way these government units conduct the public's business. Raising the level 
of information given to governmental decision makers - and to the public - provides a 
middle ground between those who wish to expand regulation uncritically and those who 
want to eliminate it entirely. 
To support these specific recommendations, I suggest four basic principles to 
guide future regulatory reform efforts. In effect, these principles put the onus on the 
proponents of regulation to prove the case for more government intervention. 
# 1. Regulation is only warranted when markets do not work as well as regulation. 
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#2. Before they take action, Congress and the regulatory agencies should 
carefully weigh the costs and benefits of proposed laws and regulations; the effectiveness 
of these measures should be evaluated using sound science. 
#3. Whenever feasible, the power of market incentives should be used to pursue 
regulatory goals instead of command-and-control directives. For example, a fuel tax 
(though I do not advocate one) would be more effective than fuel economy standards for 
reducing energy consumption. 
#4. Delegations of regulatory authority by Congress should contain specific 
limits to make sure that regulatory authority is not exercised capriciously. Overly 
complex regulations are particularly a problem for smaller businesses who are not wise to 
the ways of Washington. 
When we examine the nature of the debate over a typical regulatory proposal, we 
find a standard pattern: the proponents focus on the seriousness of the problem and the 
good their approach will accomplish. The opponents are a mirror image - they 
accentuate the burdens to be imposed and the shortcomings of the proposal. 
Usually both sides have a point and neither should be ignored. Good public 
policy making requires identifying and evaluating the full range of advantages and 
disadvantages of proposals for change. That can be done formally and comprehensively 
by using a professional methodology such as benefit-cost analysis or cost-effectiveness 
analysis. But, formally or informally, decision makers in the government should not just 
listen to one side of the debate, no matter how vocal the adherents. They should make a 
conscientious effort to weigh the pluses and minuses of a new regulatory law or rule 
before they proceed. 
Government officials often overlook a fundamental fact in their rush to intervene 
in the private sector: individuals and private organizations have a tremendous ability to 
t' 
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deal on their own with the shortcomings of a modem economy. Relying on private 
initiative moves us closer to the ideal of a free society while simultaneously providing a 
powerful incentive to improve economic performance. Regulatory and other compulsory 
powers of government should be a last, and not a first, resort. 
